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Aristotle's *First Philosophy* as Analytical Epistemology

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Abstract

We analyze metaphysical foundations of the logical and epistemological construction of knowledge in Aristotle's *First Philosophy*. The possibility to define this construction as *analytical epistemology* is deduced from the fact that Aristotle used the term *substance* (οὐσία) in many equivalent expressions and different semantic roles, but with the same meaning. The basis for that is a *semantic convertibility* (ἀντίστροφειν) of the concept of *substance* (or "what is", or the "essence" of being) in each of the fields of knowledge. Here we have listed the four most general aspects of the meaning of the term *substance* (οὐσία) and expanded them to ten aspects in their specific use in the physical, logical, linguistic and ontological domains. Because of all of the above, we define Aristotle's *First Philosophy* (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) as *analytical epistemology*, as a system of knowledge and cognition based on a system of many senses of the term *substance* or conceptual conversions of the term οὐσία. In doing so, we observed these models of conversion of the meaning of the term *substance* through four predicative forms: synonymous, homonymous, paraonymous and analogical, which are based on four aspects of the concept of identity as *logical sameness*: that which is the same / identical (τὸ αὐτόν) because it belongs to the same genus (γένος), or belongs to the same / identical (τὸ ὁμοῖον) species (εἶδος), or has the same / identical (τὸ ἴσον) number (ἀριθμός) or same/identical semantical relations (τὸ ἀνάλογον). It can be seen that conceptual analogy (ἀναλογία) is the

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basis of all semantic transformations through which the concept of substance (οὐσία) goes in analytical epistemology.

Key words: substance, οὐσία, epistemology, Aristotle, *First Philosophy*, conversion, logic, metaphysics, analytical epistemology

Introduction

To provide a *logical* and *epistemological* construction of a system of knowledge means (1) to find a way to translate complex concepts into simpler ones and in this way to perform a reconstruction of the conceptual system in a certain area, (2) to reduce the knowledge of complex objects to the knowledge of simple objects (objects-paradigms) . Analytical epistemology reduces the complex to the simple or derives the complex from the simple in the explanation of the conceptual and objective construction of knowledge. In the construction of Aristotle's *First Philosophy* as a conceptual and doctrinal system, the central and fundamental concept is the concept of substance or essence of being (οὐσία). And this very concept is the basic and main block of all conceptual transformations that have their own logical and epistemological consequences. It is necessary to add that these transformations are also semantic transformations that establish the *logical equivalence* of "the way something is said" and *analogy* as a semantic form of identity. In this way, the *analytical epistemology* that is in the foreground in Aristotle becomes a model for the research of anything: the discovery of (1) the way in which something *is* (being: ἐστίν), (2) the way (name: ὄνομα) in which something *is said* (λέγεται, λεγέσθαι) and (3) the way (statement: λόγος) in which something *is categorized* (κατηγορεῖν, κατηγορεῖσθαι) according to the logical-semantic identity attributed to it in a form of statement (λόγος ἀποφαντικός).

Aristotle founded the first scientific system of knowledge on scientific conclusion (συλλογισμός) and scientific proof (ἀπόδειξις) which rests on "metaphysical truths", which today, from the empirical perspective of science, looks absurd. However, Aristotle's "physics" and "logic" or "poetics" and "politics" are only a mirror of his "metaphysics" (Cassirer)². All human knowledge is "metaphysically based", on first

² Cassirer, E. (1923): Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Berlin. S. 4: "Die Aristotelische Logik ist in ihren allgemeinen Prinzipien der getreue Ausdruck und Spiegel der Aristotelischen Metaphysik" [In its general principles, Aristotelian logic is the faithful expression and mirror of Aristotelian metaphysics] (S. 4), and in another place: "Das spezifische Fassung der Aristotelischen Logik ist somit bedingt durch die spezifische Fassung seines Seinsbegriffs" [The specific frame of Aristotelian logic is therefore conditioned by the specific frame of his concept of being], (S. 10).

causes and first principles (αἱ πρῶται ἄρχαι καὶ πρῶται αἰτίαι), because what is metaphysical is actually a mirror of what exists, whether it is sense-existing, logically-existing, semantically-existing or extra-sensory existing. What "exists by itself" (καθ' αὐτόσ) establishes existence in every other domain and explains the unity of the world in the unity of knowledge about the world as a whole.

So "what is by itself" (τὸ τί ἐστίν, εἶναι καθ' αὐτόσ) establishes existence in every other domain of being (τὸ ὄν) and explains the unity of the world in the unity of knowledge about the world as a whole. This is why it is impossible to call Aristotle's *First Philosophy* (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) as *metaphysics* (τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ), that "what comes after", behind, or after any other knowledge, but actually that which precedes and causes all knowledge about the world and all its phenomena. It is much more accurate to say that the *First Philosophy* is *analytical onto-theology* of one chain of essence and existence that investigates the logic of beings (ὄν) and the logic of the Being (τὸ εἶναι) and the logic of the One (ἓν) and the logic of a god (θέωσ). Aristotle's *First Philosophy* is precisely an analytical *pan-epistemology*, the explanation of the connection of all levels of essence and existence in the explanation of the connection of all levels of knowledge and cognition. The basis of this analytical pan-epistemology is Aristotle's concept of the substance or essence of being (οὐσία), which connects the Being of beings and its appearance in all domains of existence? How was it possible to give such an explanation of existence and the knowledge about existence on the concept of essence (substance)? However, here, perhaps, it is good to recall one of Hegel's (Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, II) characterizations of Aristotle's System of Substances, which is connected by the concept of being (οὐσία) as a constant:

"It seems that Aristotle always philosophized only about the individual, about what is particular, without talking about what is absolute, general, what is god; it continuously moves forward from individual to individual. He takes into consideration the entire mass of the world of representations and studies it: soul, movement, feeling, memory, thought, - his daily work is what it is, - as a professor does his work in a half-year course; and, as it seems, he only came to know the truth about what is particular, what is only individual, to a series of special truths, - what is general he does not point out... He did not logically point out the general idea - otherwise, as a method, it would aim to learn one concept in everything; only and only one absolute, - so that it (the idea of God) appears instead of it, also, as something particular in addition to the other peculiarities, and that the whole truth is in this: 'There are plants, animals, men, besides that and god, that what is most excellent' " (Hegel, 1986, p. 151).

Analytical onto-theology is not logic in the sense in which we have that science today. This is why Aristotle did not use the term logic unless he thought that something should be investigated "according to the concept" (κατὰ τὸν λόγον), or "in

a logical way" (λογικότερων). This conceptual way of researching (1) the essence of being and its existence through (2) what is dependent only on the essence and (3) what is dependent only on existence and through (4) what is dependent on the union of essence and existence was a way to constantly reveal the truth: the essence is actual and primary and as such is the cause, existence is a possible consequence. So, this investigation of the "logic of being, being, one and God" is actually a semantic investigation of concepts through the ways in which they are said (λεγέσθαι), through a discussion of the meanings of the terms in which these concepts appear. Here, in Aristotle, "logic" is literally "an organ of the semantic self-world" (as Robert B. Brandom says) and not some formal science. For Aristotle, formal science was the syllogistic presented in the First Analytics. Knowledge about how and in how many ways something is said (λέγεται, λεγέσθαι) and in how many meanings it is taken (σημαίνει) is knowledge that necessarily precedes (προϋγκινώσκειν) the construction of scientific knowledge. Therefore, Aristotle's semantic epistemology must be taken as the basis of a scientific system that enables the development and foundation of science (ἐπιστήμη) about anything. And this applies to every single science: with every research, one must first know that something exists (ὅτι ἔστι), and knowledge about what its name means (τὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἔστι) (Ar. Second Analytic, 71a5). The methodology is the same for truth research. The science of truth (ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῆς ἀλήθειας) which is called philosophy (φιλοσοφία) also requires prior knowledge, prior philosophy: knowledge that deals with the first causes and first principles of being as being (τὸ ὄν ἢ ὅν), and this means knowledge of being (τὸ εἶναι). And knowledge about being is approached through semantic onto-theology, since being also has qualities (properties) that belong to it by itself. This semantic epistemology deals with the first causes and inherent principles of being as a being and those properties that belong to it as a being, and only after that are possible sciences that deal with one area of being... That is why this primordial semantic epistemology as a pan-epistemology is actually Aristotle's *First Philosophy*.

The central concept of this doctrine on pan-epistemology is the concept of substance (οὐσία) and the multiplicity of its convertible meanings. In this text, we will treat this concept as a convertible currency for all domains that appear in the pan-epistemological field of human knowledge of the world.

For the essence of being in the *ontological sense*, Aristotle in his writings most often uses the term substance (οὐσία), then "primarily substance" (πρώτερα οὐσία; in the plural: αἱ πρώτως οὐσῆαι), while in the *logical sense* for the essence of being he uses the term "second substances" (δεύτεραι οὐσῆαι) by which he means the species and genera of the first substances.

It looks very simple: Aristotle says in the Categories: the first substance is τὸδε τί, that which is one in number and indivisible being, "Socrates", "this thing", "that man". Second substances are the species and genera in which the first substances are included (περιεχόμενον). The first substance is the subject (ὑποκειμένον) of proposition (λόγος), the second substances are predicates (κατηγορουμένον).

For example statement "Socrates is a man". It is just one form of subject-predicate relationship. The second form is when second substance, genus or species, is in the place or in the role of the subject and when the predicate refers to it. There is the relation of predication of the predicate to the predicate which has the role of the subject. Such is the statement "Man is an animal". The third form is when the predicate of the predicate is in the place of the subject: "An animal is a being that has a cause of movement within itself." Here the predicate (being) is connected to the predicate of the predicate (animal)...

The logical and linguistic position of first and second substances, that is, second and second substances, takes place in each of the ten categories that constitute the statement (λόγος). The difference is in the type of predication: one is synonymous predication, the second is homonymous, the third is paronymous predication. Synonyms (συνώνυμα) are things (not words) that are associated with synonymous words in synonymous predication!!! Other things are homonyms (ὁμώνυμα) which are connected with homonymous expressions in homonymous predication. This connection in a predicative form such as λόγος ἀποφαντικός takes place through concept of identity (τὸ αὐτόν): in synonymous predication through the gender identity of things and the name of the genus that includes them (περιεχεῖν), in homonymous predication through the thing and the name of the species. Problems arise when homonymous expressions are introduced into the form of synonymous predication and vice versa.

The fourth type of predication is, in the logical sense, a pseudo-predicative form and has the role of an ontological or abstract identity that is neither gender, class nor number identity, but goes beyond the highest gender. The analogy (ἀναλογία) that occurs above species and genus is more a form of identity between abstract terms, such as the analogy (sameness) between the being (τὸ ὄν) and the one (τὸ ἓν) in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Everything that is true for the being (τὸ ὄν) is also true for the one (τὸ ἓν); everything that is said about being is also said about one. Kao što kaže Aristotel (1) τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς: the being is said in many ways (M.), i (2) τὸ ἓν λέγεται πολλαχῶς : the one is said in many ways (M.).

Synonymous predicates of synonymous things in synonymous predication are convertible with a substance that has the role of subject (ὕποκειμένον) in the statement (λόγος). The subject is the bearer of the name and the bearer of essential properties and accidental properties that are related to it in the role of predicate or in the role of attribute. But not all of them are convertible with a substance, only those that express an essential property, i.e. an specific difference. Synonymous predication is a form of convertible relationship between subject and predicate, homonymous is not. Homonymous predication is the relation of subject and accidental properties.

How is it possible that one term such as the essence of being (substance, οὐσία) has so many roles in explaining the ontological, logical, linguistic-grammatical structure of reality and also that it has a role above gender (γένος), above species (εἶδος) and above number (ἀρίθμος) that form the basis of establishing identity (τὸ αὐτόν) between beings what enables their definition and science about them? Here we will state a preliminary thesis that the central concept that enables all the roles of the term substance (οὐσία) is actually convertibility (ἀντιστρέφειν), which is understood here not only in the logical and linguistic sense but also in the ontological sense. In the ontological sense, being is convertible with one and one is convertible with being. That's what the analogy is for.

Οὐσία and its Convertible Logical Forms

The substance can neither be defined nor demonstrated, but it can be converted into a parts of definition / statement (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) or some expressions that explain it and substitute it! Aristotle calls these parts of the definition "second substances" (δεύτεραι οὐσίαι) but I will label them as "pseudo-substances" or "non-predicative substances" or "formal substances" because of their mode of existence as hypostasis (incorporeal existence) or because they lack matter (ύλη). The first substance (πρῶτη οὐσία) can be called "complete substance" or "original substance", the one that is the uncaused cause (μὴ αἰτιαίτον αἰτίον) of everything else and that possesses matter and form together.

Non-predicative substances and predicative substance.

One of them is an essential or necessary property (τὸ ἕδιον) and the other is a cause, i.e. that what must already be or exist, what is earlier, what precedes, in order for something else to arise as a consequence or as what is later, and in a logical sense as what follows. Substance in that role is earlier and is the subject (το ὑποκειμενον) to properties (τα υπαρχοντα), so it is the cause or what must be in order for something

else to be. In the logical sense, substance is always the cause of the truth of the conclusion, that is, it is through its convertible form or pseudo-substance, which is a set of its essential properties (τά ὑπάρχοντα), the middle term (μέσον) and the cause of the truth of the conclusion and opinion in general. In this role of cause, essence or substance is the cause of the existence of beings, and "what was to be" or what was (cause) for something to be (effect, consequence), for which Aristotle coined the term τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι, and which is the cause of the existence of beings and the truth of the conclusion.

Here we want to consider the following question: which parts of the definition are convertible with substance? Obviously, it depends on the type of identity equivalence in the definition. If the semantic or logical equivalence is part of the synonymous predication then the definition is convertible with the substance in the place of the subject. It is therefore about the relationship between οὐσία and λόγος τῆς οὐσίας. Whether a substance is convertible by its own definition (ἴδιον λόγον) or a common definition (κοινὸν λόγον). In the first case, it is a homonymous predication where the species (εἶδος) is a part of the definition that relates to a being, but not a distinct difference: Socrates is a man. The picture of Socrates is a representation of a man, but the painted man is different from the real man, so there are two distinct definitions, the definition of Socrates and the definition of the picture of Socrates. What is a species, "man" is their common name, but they do not have a common qualitative difference. It is different with the definition of man and ox: they have a common name (animal) as two different species of the same genus (they are of the same genus) and the genus is predicated to them equally with all the differences: all the properties that belong to an animal per se belong to both man and ox as species of animal. That is why they have a common (but not the same) name and the same (common) definition.

What is convertible with substance in these definitions? The very term human and living being are not convertible: every human is a living being, but not every living being is human. Only when the gender is taken with the excellent difference that determines man in its own way, does the gender become convertible with substance: Man is a rational living being and every rational being is a man. This means that other substances can be predicates and part of a definition, but they cannot be a definition themselves because they must have a specific difference with them.

An essential property (τὸ ἴδιον) becomes a pseudo-substance or a convertible logical and semantic equivalence because it is expressed (λέγεσθαι, κατηγορεῖσθαι) in the meaning or category of what "is being" (τὸ τὶ ἐστίν), that is, in the form in which being is also expressed. But "what was to be" (τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι) being is a paradeigm

of the ontological status of the relation of cause and effect, and only then an explanation of the logical status in which essence or substance (οὐσία) is also the cause of the existence of beings. This expression can be converted with the expression what "is" something only when substance is also the cause of the existence of beings.

On Meanings of the Term "Substance" (οὐσία)

In fact, the difference between Aristotelianism and Platonism is precisely the difference in the interpretation of the concept of substance (οὐσία). Plato uses this term in the *Phaedo* (78d) and *Timaeus* (29c), and with this term he means separate and reality-separated forms (ideas) that are the essence of things, while Aristotle completely transforms this term, giving it a multiple meaning, in fact a central place in his ontology, epistemology and logic. Aristotle concentrated his entire philosophy around the concept of οὐσία and made it the main instrument of differentiation from every other philosophy, both pre-Socratic and Stoic, and especially from the one that came from Plato and his followers from the Academy.

Aristotle gave the term οὐσία multiple meanings and specified multiple uses. It is about the numerous aspects that this term acquires when treating the ontological, logical, phenomenological, cause-and-effect, epistemological, and even onto-theological aspects of the relationship between thought and the world. In each of these contexts οὐσία mean **what is the first**: in ontological sense οὐσία is **the first being** (τὸ πρῶτως ὄν); in logical sense, **the first in the determination of the term / definition** (λόγῳ), in epistemological sense, **the first in cognition** (γνώσει), and **the first in time** (χρόνῳ) (M.ζ.1.1028a31).

In *Metaphysics* Aristotle stated that the main philosophical question, the question of all questions, is the one that has always been asked and the answer to it has always been looking for (ἀεὶ ζητούμενον), the question WHAT IS BEING (τὶ τὸ ὄν), and for Aristotle it was equal to the question WHAT IS SUBSTANCE (τίς ἡ οὐσία). However, it was clear to Aristotle that this question would always be controversial, always full of difficulties (ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον). And it is clear that these two terms are always, in one of the domains, convertible!

In *Metaphysics* (M.ζ3.1029a), Aristotle states clearly what should be meant by the term οὐσία. This term should be taken in four main and most general meanings:

- (1) τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι – being (as the cause of existence of being), "what was to be" being
- (2) τὸ καθόλου – what is general
- (3) τὸ γένος (ἐκάστου) – genus of each individual being

(4) τὸ ὑποκειμένον – subject / substratum

However, as these four most general meanings of the term οὐσία have their aspects in ontological, epistemological and logical contexts in which they have, according to the nature of each of these contexts, a different role, then this number of meanings of the term οὐσία in Aristotle increases considerably. In several places in *Metaphysics*, Aristotle stated what he meant by the being or the οὐσία in a concrete sense:

(1) **physical corporeal beings (matter + form)** that have within them the cause of movement and are dealt with by the science of physics (M.ζ2.1028b8);

(2) **logical-linguistic substances (forms of thought and speech)** ("second substances" - genera and species) which are part of the categorical or predicative apparatus of cognition, categorical schemes (σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας) which are dealt with by syllogistics or logic (K.5.8; K.5.14);

(3) **para-aesthetic substance (pure form)** (παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά), eternal (ἀίδιον), separate (χωριστόν) and immovable (ἀκίνητον) which is the first cause and the first beginning of being (ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτίον τῶν ὄντων) dealt with by the First Philosophy (ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία) or the science of God (θεολογικὴ ἐπιστήμη) (M.ε1.1025b1-2.1026b30).

According to Sorabji (1990, 133) "... book 12 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* proposes a system of substances (*ousiai*), a system whose unity and coherence is ensured by one and the first principle, intelligible *ousia*." This is why we will also list here the derived meanings of the term οὐσία in Aristotle that make up the system of substances that Sorabji talks about. This system of substances goes from a sensibly perceptible (aesthetic: αἰσθησίσις) substance, which is the primordial substance, to a sensibly unattainable (para-aesthetic: παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά) substance that is known by the mind or thought perception (θεωρεῖν). Between these two basic meanings of the term οὐσία, the logical-linguistic meanings of this term are arranged according to the function that this term has in the structure of thought provisions and in the structure of statements in one of the predicative forms (synonymous, homonymous or paronymous).

(1) SENSITIVE SUBSTANCE. In the most basic (κυριώτατα) meaning, οὐσία denotes every single being that is (ἐστίν), that which is indivisible (ἄτομος), that which is one in number (ἐν ἀριθμῷ), someone "this" (τόδε τι), for example

"Socrates": ἡ οὐσία ἐν τι καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνει (M. ζ12.1037b27); such a substance or being is the primary substance (πρώτερα οὐσία) and at the same time the first category as the first subject in the categorical network of predications, while in the categorical network there are second substances (δεύτεραι οὐσῖαι), which are the species and genera of the individual being. It is therefore a union of matter and form effected in a certain individual being (τόδε τι) (K.5.8; K.5.14; M.δ8.1017b10). In this sense, οὐσία is defined as the "primary subject" (τὸ ὑποκειμένον πρῶτον) which is said to be either matter (ἡ ὕλη) or form (ἡ μορφή) or a combination of the two (τὸ ἐκ τούτων) (M. ζ3.1029a1-3).

(2) THE ESSENCE OF AN INDIVIDUAL BEING. In another meaning, οὐσία is the essence or essence of an individual being or what the being is (τὶ ἐστίν) in itself (καθ' αὐτό) or what is the essence of each individual being (τόδε τι). The fact that a being is (ἐστίν) and that it is one (ἐν) belongs to every individually existing being (ὅν) is what is unique (κοινόν) or universal (καθόλου) to them. (M.ζ1.1028b2). For an individual being (ὅν) and for a species (εἶδος), the essence is their genus (γένος), because genus is what is related to them in the category "what is something" (τὶ ἐστίν). Provision is the concept of being and being belongs only to beings, primarily, primarily and absolutely: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστίν ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὁ τοῦ τὶ ἦν εἶναι λόγος, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἦν εἶναι ἢ μόνων τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν ἢ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον (M. ζ5.1030b11-14). The essence of an individual being and the individual being itself are one (M.ζ6.1032a5); the essence of an individual being is its form (M.ζ10.1035b33); form is indivisible, imperishable (M.ζ8.1034a5-8); form does not arise and does not perish, it exists by realisation (ἐντελέχειαν ὅν), and matter receives differences and it is a possible being (δύναμιν ὅν) (M.ζ9.1034b15-20); form and essence do not arise, they are always actual οὐσία, matter is potential οὐσία (M. ζ8.1033b5-10)

(3) SUBJECT OF ACIDENTAL PROPERTIES. In the third meaning, οὐσία is a subject or ὑποκειμένον for accidental properties (τὰ συμβεβηκότα) which are inseparable from matter and which cannot exist without a subject. In this sense, οὐσία is all plants and animals and all their parts (M.ζ1.1028a26; M. ζ2.1028b8-15)

(4) SUBJECT OF SPECIES PROPERTIES. In the fourth place, the οὐσία is subject (τὸ ὑποκειμένον) to essential properties, or separable and immaterial properties or specific properties (τὰ ἴδια) and differences (αἱ διαφοραί) with which it is convertible or interchangeable in definition since together they form one identity equivalence or the definition of being. There are properties that are inseparable from the subject ("being in the subject": ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν) and are

predicated (in the definition) to the subject. These are specific properties (τὰ ἴδια, τὸ ἴδιον), such as "reasonable" (λόγον ἔχον) that are attributed to man when he is defined as a "reasonable living being" (ζῷον ἔχον λόγον). In the definition, they can be converted with the subject: "Man is a rational living being" is valid as "A reasonable living being is a man."

(5) SUBJECT OF THE PREDICATE. The fifth meaning: being (οὐσία) is the logical subject (τὸ ὑποκειμένον) of predicates (τὰ κατηγορουμένα) which are not in the subject (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐκ ἐστίν), but are only said (λέγεσθαι) about subject or predicated (κατεγοῦσθαι) to subject. The first substance (πρώτερα οὐσία) is never a predicate, it is never in the subject, it is only and always the subject. (K.5.17); What is related to the subject through ten categories are the predicables (genus, species, difference, property of the species, ingredient in the subject) from which the schemes of categories (σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας) are made, which are the logical structure of the structure of each category.

(6) SPECIES AND GENERA / SECOND SUBSTANCES. In the sixth meaning are second substances (δευτεραί οὐσiai) as a type of predicate. Other substances are genera or species or substances that serve as a thought determination or predicative part in a statement and have only immaterial or hypostatic existence (K.5.21); Primary substance is more substance (μᾶλλον οὐσία) than genera and species, species is more substance than genus (K.2b.18). So, what has a lower level of logical generality is "more substance": the ontological advantage of lower levels of logical generality is clearly stated by Aristotle with the expression μᾶλλον οὐσία. What is closer to the primary substance, which is the species, is what is more specific (τὸ ἴδιον μᾶλλον), more comprehensible (γνωριμώτερον) and more suitable (οἰκεióτερον) than what is more general (τὸ κοινότερον) (K. 2b18). A species is a more accurate and appropriate answer (predicate) to the question of what something is (τί ἐστι).

(7) CAUSE OF KNOWLEDGE / CONCLUSION. In the seventh meaning, οὐσία is the middle term (τὸ μέσον) in the syllogism and as such it is the cause of the truth of the conclusion. The middle term is the cause: τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἷτιον τὸ μέσον (Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα, II.2. 90a7); the essence of a thing is the same as its cause and proof: φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν (Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα, II.2.90a14); knowing what a thing is is the same as knowing what is its cause (why it exists): τὸ τί ἐστιν εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτό ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν (Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα, II.2.90a31-32); since both premises affirm "what is" or essence, it is clear that the middle term will primarily be essence: εἰ δὲ τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἄμφω ἔχει, ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἔσται πρότερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα,

II.4.91a25); the middle term itself is essence : τὸ μέσον εἶναι τί ἐστὶ ('Αναλυτικὰ ὕστερα, II.8.93a11).

(8) THE CAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF BEINGS / THE ESSENCE OF BEINGS. In the eighth meaning, οὐσία is the essence of being: τὸ τὶ ᾗν εἶναι (M.ζ.7.1032b17); what each individual being is by itself: ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τὶ ᾗν εἶναι ἐκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ' αὐτό (M.ζ.4.1029b14); conceptual determination of the being of each individual thing: ὃ λόγος τοῦ τὶ ᾗν εἶναι ἐκάστω (M.ζ.4.1029b20); the cause of being, "what was to be" (τὸ τὶ ᾗν εἶναι); it is the uncaused cause (μὴ αἰτίατον αἰτίον) which causes all other causes; οὐσία is what must be or exist earlier (effective being, ἐνεργεῖαν ὄν) in order for the being to become at all, for it to become from a possible being (δύναμιν ὄν) (actual, ἐνεργεῖαν ὃ ν). (M.a3.983a5). Here οὐσία is determined as a pure form without matter (εἶδος ἄνευ ὕλης), because being (οὐσία) without matter is essence: λέγω οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τὶ ᾗν εἶναι. (M.ζ.7.1032b14); form is the essence of every single thing and the primary being: εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὶ ᾗν εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν (M.ζ.7.1032b1-2).

(9) THE FIRST CAUSE AND THE FIRST BEGINNING. In the ninth meaning οὐσία is the first principle and the first cause of beings (ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτίον τῶν ὄντων) as the subject of the first philosophy (ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία), that is, the science of god: θεολογικὴ ἐπιστήμη (M.ε1.1025b1-2.1026b30.) οὐσία is the first being (πρῶτον ὄν) or what is first in time, first in knowledge, first in speech (M.ζ.1.1028a31); what is said to be form (εἶδος) and being (οὐσία) does not arise (οὐ γίγνεται), while a compound being (σύνολον ὄν) named after it arises, and that in everything created there is matter (ἐν παντι τῷ γιγνώμενῳ ὕλη ἐνεστί) (M.ζ.8.1033b18-20);

(10) SUBSTANCE BEYOND AND OVER THE SENSES. At the highest level (over logical and over ontological generality) οὐσία is the para-aesthetic substance or notsensitive οὐσία (παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά) which is eternal (αἰδίων), immobile (ἀκίνητον) and separable from matter (χωρίστον); as such this substance is an absolute substance: ἀπλῶς οὐσία (M.ζ.1.1028a31), the first cause and the first principle of all reality (M.ζ.2.1028b18;), god (θεός), the First Unmoved Mover (πρῶτον κινουῦν ἀκίνητον), that which is not moved, but which moves all, which is eternal, th Being and activity itself: [ὁ θεός] ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἰδίων καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὕσα (M.λ.7.1072a26).

Conclusion

We could say that Aristotle's "system of substances" (οὐσίαι), which Sorabji talks about, is a physical, logical, linguistic, epistemological and ontological

(metaphysical) chain that goes from aesthetic (sensory) substances (αἰσθητὶς οὐσία) and their parts (Μ.) to para-aesthetic or extra-sensory substances (παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά).

For Aristotle, substance (οὐσία) is that "what is", that "what is by itself", or "what is the cause of itself ", or "what is the uncaused cause in every being that exists", and what is the cause of what exists in thinking and speaking as true. Therefore, οὐσία is "metaphysical coin" of knowledge, beginning and end of knowledge, which must be used at every level and which is convertible in every domain, in the domain of sensory existence, in the domain of thought, in the domain of speech and in the domain of para-sensory existence. Only with such a postulate can human knowledge about the physical world, about the logical world, about the world of language and about divine things be embodied. Taking the concept of substance (οὐσία) as a convertible "metaphysical currency" made it possible to establish a pan-epistemology which is actually Aristotle's *First Philosophy*.

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